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Abstract:  The article analyzes the peculiarities of the destruction of Serbian Jews during 
Second Wolrd War in the local and European context. Of all the sites in Serbia relevant to the 
destruction of the Serbian Jews, Sajmiste is the most important. After the consideration of 
the attitude of Germans and Nedic’s regime toward Jews and “Gypsies” in the context of the 
Final Solution, the author highlights that the Sajmiste internment camp was transformed 
into a local death camp—the only such site outside the territories of Poland and the Soviet 
Union. Serbia was the one country outside Poland and the Soviet Union where all Jewish 
victims were killed on the spot without deportation. It was the first country after Estonia to 
be declared “judenfrei.” Moreover, in Serbia the German army was not only complicit in the 
Holocaust but was in fact the main instigator and executioner in the killing of the Jewish 
men. For this reason, in particular, Sajmiste is a unique site for Holocaust remembrance not 
only in the Serbian but also in the European context. 
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As a specialist of the Holocaust rather than Serbian history, I would like to make 
two points that I think are relevant to the question of “the history to remember” 
about Sajmiste.1 First, the historical course of the destruction of Serbian Jews—
the Holocaust within Serbia—was both unusual and very important to under-
standing the Holocaust as a European event. When I wrote a slim book entitled 
Fateful Months: Essays on the Emergence of the Final Solution2 nearly 30 years ago, 
I focused on Serbia as a key case study for understanding the expansion of the sys-
tematic mass murder of European Jewry from what is now sometimes referred to 
as the “Holocaust by bullets,” carried out to the east of the Molotov-Ribbentrop 
line, to all the other European countries within the German sphere of power, in 
which the killing was then done primarily by poison gas. The Holocaust in Ser-
bia, I would argue, foreshadowed and illuminated this transformation. Second, of 
all the sites in Serbia relevant to the destruction of the Serbian Jews, Sajmiste is 
1  The article is a version of the paper prepared for the international conference If not now, 
when...? The Future of the site of the Old Fairgrounds (Sajmiste) in Belgrade, held inBelgrade, 
10–12 May 2012. Its organizers were The Federation of Jewish Communities in Serbia, Founda-
tion for an Open Society in Serbia, Stiftung Erinnerung-Verantwortung-Zukunft from Berlin 
and Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung in Serbia.
2  Browning 1985. The topic of the Holocaust in Serbia was subsequently treated in even 
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the most important. It should be a site of remembrance significant not only in the 
Serbian historical context but also to the Holocaust as an event of European his-
tory. Whatever else might be memorialized at Sajmiste, what makes it a site of Eu-
ropean significance is the simple and brutal fact that the Nazi regime dispatched 
a gas van to murder the Jewish women and children interned in Sajmiste in the 
spring of 1942—the first time at which Jews beyond Poland and the eastern front 
where targeted for systematic and total extermination through poison gas.
Let me review briefly the significance of the Holocaust in Serbia to the question 
of the emergence of the Final Solution as a pivotal event in European history. 
When the German army defeated and dismantled Yugoslavia and set up a military 
administration in Serbia in the spring of 1941, the standard Nazi discriminatory 
measures against the Jewish population were decreed almost immediately with 
one unusual twist—the “Gypsies” (Zigeuner in the German documents) were in-
cluded. The German invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22 then worsened their 
situation dramatically. Not only did the Einsatzgruppen and other German units 
begin murdering Jews (at first primarily adult males) and those identified as com-
munists on Soviet territory, but also in Serbia. In response to the communist-led 
uprising in Serbia, the undermanned German occupation responded with a vi-
cious deterrent policy in the form of “reprisal” killing—a policy which by the end 
of August claimed the lives of some 1,000 people identified in the German docu-
ments simply as “communists and Jews.” In addition to the killing of hostages so-
identified, however, the reprisal killing quickly expanded to the indiscriminate, 
mass execution of Serbs rounded up at the sites of partisan ambushes, because 
they were deemed “co-responsible” (mitverantworlich) for not having warned the 
Germans of the impending attacks. As German documents make clear, German 
reprisal policy in no way deterred the uprising; on the contrary, it had the dual af-
fect of driving increasing numbers of Serbs into the hands of the partisans while 
simultaneously destroying the morale of the Serbian police who had been forced 
to help implement the reprisal executions.3
By September the partisans had overrun numerous German outposts and cap-
tured over 300 German prisoners. Threatened with loss of control over most of 
the Serbian countryside, the Germans sought three remedies: the roundup and 
internment of all Jews and “Gypsies” in camps in Belgrade and Sabac, the installa-
tion of the collaborating Nedic regime to rally local anti-communist forces against 
the insurgency, and military reinforcement with frontline troops to carry out an-
ti-insurgent sweeps and savage repression. In the words of the chief of the mili-
tary administration, Harald Turner: “The entire population had to be punished, 
not only the men.”4 To which the commanding general Franz Böhme added: “An 
3   For events in the summer and fall of 1941, see Browning 1983a.
4  Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv Freiburg (hereafter BA-MA), 17 729.4, Anlage 17, Tunrer to 
Böhme, 21.9.41 (Nürnberg Document NOKW-1492).tHe eUROPeAN eXPeRIeNCeS OF ReMeMBRANCe
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  intimidating example must be created for the whole of Serbia, which must hit the 
whole population most severely.”5
Simultaneously, General Keitel of the German High Command (OKW) issued a 
directive that 50–100 “communists” be executed in reprisal for each German sol-
dier killed by insurgents. In the Soviet Union SS leaders on the central front in 
Belarus invited over 60 Wehrmacht officers to a conference in Mogilev to impress 
upon them the doctrine that “Where the partisan is, is the Jew, and where the Jew 
is, is the partisan” to encourage army participation in the killing of Soviet Jews.6 
No such antisemitic indoctrination was needed for the German military in Serbia. 
When partisans killed 21 German soldiers in Topola on October 2, two officers on 
Böhme’s staff drafted an order that “2100 prisoners in the concentration camps Sa-
bac and Belgrade (predominately Jews and Communists)” be provided for the re-
prisal shooting.7 In short, on its own the German military in Serbia chose the max-
imum rather than minimum reprisal quota (100 instead of 50) and expanded the 
pool of reprisal victims from “Communists” as specified by Keitel also to include 
Jews. A subsequent Böhme order then stipulated that “all Jews” were to be includ-
ed in the hostage pool, and a subsequent report by Turner on the implementation 
of the Topola reprisal killing makes clear that the victims were comprised solely 
of 2,000 Jews and 200 “Gypsies”—precisely the groups who had already been in-
terned in August and thus could in no way have been involved in the insurgency.8 
The whole charade of an alleged deterrent reprisal becomes even more grotesque 
when one considers that many of the Jews interned at Sabac were central Europe-
an refugees, mostly Austrian, and the Wehrmacht executioners were mostly Aus-
trian soldiers, who were thus shooting their former countrymen in retaliation for 
casualties inflicted on the German army by Serbian insurgents. 
As several German army units that swept through Kraljevo and Kragujevac in 
mid-October suffered further casualties and no nearby pool of Jewish and “Gyp-
sy” hostages was immediately available, they executed 1,755 and 2,300 local Serbs 
respectively, including the entire workforce of an airplane factory working for the 
Germans in Kraljevo and most of the students of the high school in Kragujevac. 
Appalled by the carnage, Nedic urged that such random shootings be stopped. 
Needing his help to rebuild the Serbian police and aware that such massacres 
were strengthening rather than weakening the insurgency, the Germans agreed 
that henceforth some effort would be made to screen potential reprisal victims 
5   BA-MA, 17 729.4, Anlage 31, Böhme order to the troops, 25.9.41 (NOKW-1048).
6   Beorn 2011.
7   BA-MA, 17 729.8, Anlage 24, Faulmüller draft of order to Turner and 342nd division, 4.10.41 
(NOKW-192).
8   BA-MA, 17 729.9, Anlage 48, Böhme order, 10.10.41 (NOKW-891 and 557). NO-5810: Turner 
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and distinguish between the categories of guilty, suspicious, and “innocent” 
Serbs. This made it all the more imperative that “it is a matter of principle…to put 
all Jewish men and all male Gypsies at the disposal of the troops as hostages.”9 
While Turner was well aware that “it is false, if one is to be precise about it, that 
for murdered Germans—on whose account the ratio 1:100 should really be borne 
by Serbs—100 Jews are shot instead; but,” as he went on to explain, “the Jews we 
had in camps … and besides they have to disappear.”10 Accordingly, German firing 
squads—composed of both military and police units—completed the destruction 
of the male Jews and “Gypsies” before the end of the year, with the exception of a 
small group of Jewish workers spared for conversion of the Sajmiste fairgrounds 
into the new site of internment for the Jewish and “Gypsy” women and children 
whose husbands and fathers had just been killed. 
I have referred to this first stage of the destruction of Serbian Jews in the latter half 
of 1941 as a “prelude” to the Final Solution, in that Jews were killed solely because 
they were Jews, but the policy of total extermination—including women and chil-
dren (as was already underway on Soviet territory since the summer of 1941)—was 
not yet being implemented in Serbia. From the perspective of German history, 
this episode demonstrates beyond any doubt the falsity of the “legend of the clean 
Wehrmacht,” for it was the military, not the SS, that was primarily responsible for 
instigating and implementing the destruction of the male Jews and “Gypsies.” But 
it is indicative of a wider European phenomenon as well. Jews and “Gyspies” were 
especially at peril in Nazi-dominated Europe not only because of Nazi ideology 
and power but also because in so few countries were they viewed as full members 
of the national community. In Serbia Nedic pleaded for more careful screening 
in the selection of Serbian hostages but made no similar request concerning Jews 
and “Gypsies.” And the Germans, who conceded the notion of “innocent” Serbs 
but deemed all Jews to be enemies, realized that they if they filled their reprisal 
quotas by killing male Jews and “Gypsies” rather than randomly victimizing Serbs, 
there would be no political cost in terms of either undermining the Nedic collabo-
ration regime or driving significant numbers of young Serbian men into the hands 
of the partisans.
Let me now turn to the fate of the Jewish women and children in Serbia. Before the 
German occupation authorities in Serbia had discovered the convenience of hav-
ing large numbers of interned Jews as a pool of reprisal hostages whose execution 
had no local political cost, they had vigorously but unsuccessfully pressed Berlin 
for their deportation to Romanian or Soviet territory. When the killing of the male 
Jews was already underway, representatives from Berlin assured the   Germans in 
9   Nürnberg Document NOKW-802: Turner to Feldkommandanturen and Kreiskomman-
danturen, 26.10.41.
10   Nürnberg Document NO-5810: Turner to Hildebrandt, 17.10.41.tHe eUROPeAN eXPeRIeNCeS OF ReMeMBRANCe
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Belgrade that “as soon as the technical possibility exists within the framework of 
the total solution of the Jewish question,” the remaining Jewish women and chil-
dren “will be deported … to the reception camps in the east.”11 This was, of course, 
the eventual fate of the Jews in the other countries of southern, central, and west-
ern Europe, who were deported to death camps in Poland. Uniquely, the remain-
ing Jews in Serbia—both refugee and native—were not deported to face death in 
Nazi gas chambers in Poland. Instead the Sajmiste internment camp was trans-
formed into a local death camp—the only such site outside the territories of Po-
land and the Soviet Union—and the Jews were killed in a gas van dispatched from 
Berlin as it drove through downtown Belgrade on its way to the burial site on the 
other side of the city. 
Why did this happen in Serbia but not in other countries in Nazi-occupied Europe 
is the obvious question, but it is a question for which historians lack sufficient evi-
dence to provide a definitive answer. Due to insufficient evidence, the best I can 
do is speculate on the basis of the behavior patterns of the Nazis in other some-
what similar circumstances at this time. 
We do know that the design, testing, and conversion of the gas vans in the motor 
pool of the Security Police in Berlin resulted from complaints by the Einsatzgrup-
pen in the Soviet Union concerning the psychological burden on the shooters in 
killing women and children. We know that when the German authorities in Lodz 
complained about the overcrowding that would result from Himmler’s plans to 
send numerous transports of Jews there from the Third Reich in the fall of 1941, 
the result was the construction of the death camp at Chelmno, equipped with gas 
vans, to reduce the ghetto population. It began its killing operations on December 
8, 1941, the exact day on which the Jewish women and children in Belgrade were 
assembled for internment in Sajmiste. We know the Germans in Belgrade never 
ceased to press for the deportation of the Jews interned there. We know that after 
Hans Frank had failed to get approval to deport Jews from the General Govern-
ment to the east, he reported to his followers in Krakau: “In Berlin we were told: 
why all this trouble; we cannot use them in the Ostland or the Reichskommis-
sariat either; liquidate them yourselves!”12 What followed was the completion of 
the first death camp in the General Government, Belzec, where gassing Jews from 
Galicia and Lublin began on March 15, just three days before Götz and Meyer be-
gan killing the patients of the Jewish hospitals in Belgrade as a preliminary to the 
liquidation of the Sajmiste Jews.13
11  AktenzurdeutschenauswäritgenPolitik, 1918–1945, Series D, vol. 13/2, pp. 570–72 (Radem-
acher report to Foreign Office, 25.10.41)
12   Präg, Jacobmeyer 1975: 457–58.
13   For the overall course of events leading up to the Final Solution, see Browning, with a 
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Given these facts, I would speculate that the decision to send a gas van to Bel-
grade resulted from a conjuncture of factors that came into play in the winter of 
1941–42. Heydrich was receiving complaints from a number of impatient Nazi oc-
cupation authorities about their Jews, whether in Lodz over the arrival of addi-
tional transports of Jews from the Reich or in the General Government and Bel-
grade about the failure of Berlin to help them to get rid of their Jews as soon as 
possible, because big death camps with the capacity to kill Jews in such numbers 
had not yet been constructed. In English there is a saying that “the squeaky wheel 
gets the grease.” In this case the loudest and most incessant complainers were the 
first ones to be provided with the means to kill their own Jews rather than bother 
Heydrich further. And in the case of Sajmiste, this came in the form of the newly-
developed gas vans, being converted and staffed with drivers in Heydrich’s own 
Security Police motor pool in Berlin, that had been explicitly designed to kill pre-
cisely those categories of Jews—women and children—interned there. And final-
ly, due to the partisan uprising, Serbia—like the east—was a theater of war where 
the local killing—unthinkable in places like Paris or Amsterdam--could take place 
relatively unobtrusively amidst the German reprisal shootings, battles with parti-
sans, and flood of Serbian refugees bringing horrific stories of Ustasha atrocities 
in neighboring Croatia.14
In summary, the Holocaust in Serbia has a number of distinct features. It was the 
one country outside Poland and the Soviet Union where all Jewish victims were 
killed on the spot without deportation. It was the first country after Estonia—with 
its meager Jewish population of less than 1,000—to be declared “judenfrei.” It was 
the country where the German army was not only complicit in the Holocaust but 
was in fact the main instigator and executioner in the killing of the Jewish men. 
And it was the only country outside Polish and Soviet territory where an intern-
ment camp—Sajmiste—was transformed into a death camp to annihilate the re-
maining Jewish population with poison gas. For this reason, in particular, Sajmiste 
is a unique site for Holocaust remembrance not only in the Serbian but also in the 
European context. It should be restored, preserved, and memorialized accordingly.
Primljeno: 27. novembar 2012.
Prihvaćeno: 18. decembar 2012.
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Sajmište kao evropsko mesto sećanja na Holokaust
Apstrakt
Članak analizira osobenosti uništenja srpskih jevreja tokom Drugog svetskog rata u lo-
kalnom i evropskom kontekstu. Od svih mesta u Srbiji koja su relevantna za uništenje 
jevreja, Sajmište je najvažnije. Nakon razmatranja stava Nemaca i Nedićevog režima 
prema jevrejima i „Ciganima“, autor ističe da je od logora za internaciju, Sajmište tran-
sformisano u lokalni logor smrti, jedini takav izvan teritorija Poljske i Sovjetskog Saveza: 
osim Poljske i Sovjetskog Saveza, Srbija je jedina zemlja gde su jevrejske žrtve   ubijane 
na licu mesta, bez deportacije. Posle estonije, prva je zemlja koja je proglašena za juden-
frei. Štaviše, u Srbiji nemačka vojska bila je ne samo saučesnik u Holokaustu već i glavni 
podstrekač i izvršilac ubijanja jevreja. Posebno zbog ovih razloga, Sajmište predstavlja 
jedinstveno mesto sećanjа na Holokaust, ne samo u srpskom već i u evropskom kon-
tekstu.
Ključne reči  Srbija, Konačno rešenje, jevreji, Romi, Nedić, Vermaht, dušegupka.